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ABSTRACT: The editors of the French edition of Michel Foucault's Introduction to Kant's 
Anthropology claim that Foucault started rereading Kant through Nietzsche in 1952 and then 
began rereading Kant and Nietzsche through Heidegger in 1953. This claim has not received 
much attention in the scholarly literature, but its significance should not be underestimated. In 
this article, I assess the likelihood that the editor’s claim is true and show how Foucault’s 
introduction to Kant’s Anthropology and his comments about Kant in The Order of Things echo the 
concerns about finitude and subjectivity in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I then 
argue that Foucault's later preoccupation with Kant's essay An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? should be regarded as an attempt to develop an alternative to the Heideggerian 
interpretation of Kant, and the preoccupation with finitude, that had played such an important 
role in Foucault’s earlier works.  
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Introduction 
The editors of the French edition of Michel Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology have 
claimed, in their présentation of the work, that Foucault started rereading Kant through Nietzsche 
in 1952 and then began rereading Kant and Nietzsche through Heidegger in 1953.1 Their claim 
has not received much attention, but its significance should not be underestimated.  
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant, edited by D. Defert, Fr. Ewald, F. Gros (Paris: J. Vrin, 
2008), 8; Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 10. It is significant that the editors—Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Frédéric 
Gros—say that Foucault started “rereading” Kant through Nietzsche and Heidegger in the early 1950’s, since the 
title of Foucault’s lost DEA thesis (La Constitution d’un transcendental historique dans La Phénomenologie de l’Esprit 
de Hegel, 1949) also suggests an earlier engagement with Kant. 
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If Foucault read Kant through Heidegger in the early 1950’s, it is likely that this reading 
influenced his understanding of Kant in the early 1960’s. And this would illuminate Foucault’s 
introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as well as the peculiar role Kant 
plays in The Order of Things. It would also explain some of the tensions in Foucault’s later writings 
on the critical attitude of the enlightenment and its relation to Kant’s critical philosophy. These 
tensions could be seen as evidence that Foucault was developing an alternative interpretation of 
Kant, which dispensed with the earlier, more Heideggerian concerns about finitude and the 
philosophy of the subject. 
Before elaborating any further on the significance of the editors’ claim, I will have to 
determine whether their claim is accurate. I address this problem in Section 2, which assesses the 
likelihood that Heidegger’s influence shaped Foucault’s interpretation of Kant in the early 1950’s. 
I try to determine whether Heidegger continued to influence his understanding of Kant in the 
1960’s in Section 3, where I examine Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, and Section 4, 
where I turn my attention to The Order of Things. Finally, in Section 5, I show that Foucault’s 
preoccupation with Kant’s essay An Answer to the Quesetion: What is Enlightenment? in the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s is, at least in part, an attempt to develop an alternative to the 
Heideggerian interpretation of Kant that had played such an important role in his earlier works. 
While Heidegger profoundly influenced Foucault’s understanding of Kant, that influence was not 
unproblematic, especially as Foucault began to consider the practices of freedom through which 
subjects constitute themselves as something other than the empirical-transcendental double that 
man had become for the human sciences. 
 
Background & Context 
In the last interview he gave before his death, Foucault called Heidegger “the essential 
philosopher.”2 He goes on to say that Nietzsche exerted a greater influence on his thought than 
Heidegger, though he claims not to have understood Nietzsche until he started reading him 
through Heidegger.3 The dates Foucault mentions in the interview seem to confirm the editors’ 
claim that he was reading Nietzsche through Heidegger in the early 1950’s. Unfortunately, 
Foucault does not mention Kant at any point in the interview, so it remains unclear whether he 
thought Heidegger was as decisive an influence on his reading of Kant as he was on his 
understanding of Nietzsche. 
It would not be surprising if Foucault were reading Kant through Heidegger at the same 
as Heidegger was shaping his reading of Nietzsche. We know that Foucault studied with Jean 
Beaufret at the École normale supérieure (ENS) at some point between 1946 and 1951.4 Beaufret was 
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, edited by Sylvère Lotringer, translated by Lysa 
Hochroth and John Johnston (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1996), 470. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Foucault entered the ENS in 1946 and received his aggregation in 1951, after failing the examination in 1950. 
His biographers do not indicate when precisely he studied with Beaufret. 
McQuillan: Beyond the Analytic of Finitude 
186 
 
the recipient of Heidegger’s famous Letter on Humanism and the foremost Heideggerian in France 
at the time. His positions at the ENS and the elite Lycées Henry IV and Condorcet put him in a 
good position to influence the best and brightest students in France. And Beaufret apparently 
used the opportunities these positions afforded him to great effect. Some of the philosophers 
interviewed in Dominique Janicaud’s Heidegger en France report that they absorbed a 
Heideggerian view of the history of philosophy without even realizing it, because Beaufret never 
mentioned Heidegger’s name.5 The publication of Beaufret’s Leçons de Philosophie suggest that 
Heidegger played a more explicit role in his lectures than Janicaud’s interviews suggest. The 
published Leçons begin with a thoroughly Heideggerian reflection on the relation between 
philosophy and metaphysics.6 The same lecture contains a long section on Husserl and 
Heidegger.7 The lectures that follow also make explicit reference to Heidegger’s views on 
Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.8  
Didier Eribon has said that Beaufret “talked a great deal about Heidegger” during the 
lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason that Foucault attended.9 Beaufret’s lectures on the Critique of 
Pure Reason do not often mention Heidegger, but there can be little doubt that his interpretation of 
Kant is based on Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Like Heidegger, Beaufret argues 
that the transcendental aesthetic is only intelligible after one has read the transcendental analytic 
and, especially, the chapter on the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding.10 And 
while he rejects Heidegger’s claim that the pure concepts of the understanding are “ontological 
predicates,” the fact that Beaufret devotes a special section of his lectures on the Critique of Pure 
Reason to this question is all the more evidence that he was following Heidegger very closely. 11 
Finally, it should be noted that Beaufret affirms the centerpiece of Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Kant, the “transcendental finitude” of the “I think,” when he insists that transcendental 
apperception is essentially finite, since human beings lack the power of intellectual intuition.12 If 
Foucault attended lectures like the ones contained in Beaufret’s Leçons de Philosophie, then it is 
almost certain that he was reading Kant in a way that was strongly influenced by Heidegger. 
Even if he did not inherit a Heideggerian reading of Kant from Beaufret, Foucault could 
have developed it by reading Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics himself. In fact, Heidegger’s 
Kantbuch was translated into French by Alphonse de Waehlens and Walter Biemel in 1953, the 
same year Foucault’s editors say he began reading Kant and Nietzsche through Heidegger. The 
                                                 
5 Dominique Janicaud, Heidegger en France (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 2001), 48, 210; see also Gary Gutting, 
Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 10.  
6 Jean Beaufret, Leçons de Philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 17-38. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 56, 69, 70, 87, 108, 110, 113, 125, 138, 162-165, 170, 173, 219, 236 
9 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, translated by Betsy Wang (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31. 
10 Beaufret, Leçons de Philosophie, 42-43. See also Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated 
by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, 5th edition), 102 [§28]. 
11 Beaufret, Leçons de Philosophie, 49-50. See also Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 39 [§12]. 
12 Beaufret, Leçons de Philosophie, 59-60. See also Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 158-162 [§41]. 
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translation by de Waehlens and Biemel made Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics a standard 
reference for French Kantians. Jules Vuillemin, the Kant scholar who recommended Foucault for 
his position in University of Lille in 1952, hired him at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 
1960, and later nominated him to the Collège de France, draws extensively on its account of 
temporality in L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne, which was published in 1954.13 Even 
Alain Renaut, who is otherwise quite critical of Heidegger, devotes several chapters to 
Heidegger’s reading of Kant in Kant Aujourd’hui. Renaut ultimately rejects Heidegger’s anti-
humanism, but he accepts the Heideggerian premise that Kant distinguishes himself from the 
Cartesian tradition by emphasizing the “radical finitude” of human knowledge.14 This is hardly 
surprising, since Renaut had studied with Beaufret and began his career as a Heideggerian.15 
Hans Sluga has argued that if Foucault read Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, then it 
“left no further trace in his thinking, apart, perhaps, from stimulating him to study Kant.”16 
However, I think it is fairly clear that Foucault was among those whose understanding of Kant 
was shaped by Beaufret’s Heideggerian lectures on the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger’s 
Kantbuch, and its enthusiastic reception in French Kant scholarship. The evidence I have 
presented does not definitively prove the influence of Heidegger on Foucault’s reading of Kant in 
the early 1950’s, but I think it shows such an influence is both possible and probable. There is 
certainly a chance that the editors’ comment is not accurate and that Foucault arrived at his 
concerns about the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental and the analytic of 
finitude independently of Heidegger, but I think this is highly unlikely. The effects of Heidegger’s 
influence on Foucault’s reading of Kant are both obvious and substantial in the works he 
published in the 1960’s, especially his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology and The Order of Things. 
 
Heidegger, Foucault, and Kant’s Anthropology 
In the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology and The Order of Things, Foucault cites the famous 
question “What is man?” from Kant’s Logic.17 This reference should be regarded as a kind of 
Heideggerian shibboleth. Until very recently, Kant scholars have not concerned themselves much 
                                                 
13 Jules Vuillemin, L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne (Paris: PUF, 1954), 210-296. 
14 Alain Renaut, Kant Aujourd’hui (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), 96-107. 
15 Renaut broke with Beaufret in a review of his edition of Martin Heidegger, Questions IV (Paris: Gallimard, 
1976). While the objections Renaut raised in his review were primarily philological, he moved closer to the 
nouveaux philosophes during the 1980’s and begain publishing a series of polemics against Heidegger with Luc 
Ferry. See, for example, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties, translated by Mary H.S. 
Cattani (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985). 
16 Hans Sluga,“Foucault’s Encounter with Heidegger and Nietzsche,” in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [2nd edition]), 221. 
17 Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs (Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 74-76, 82-87; Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 341. 
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with this question, as it appears in a work of dubious authorship and questionable authenticity.18 
Never one to let merely philological considerations constrain a “thoughtful dialogue” with the 
works of his predecessors, however, Heidegger made the question “what is man?” central to his 
argument in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.19 Reference to this question, and the assumption 
that it reveals the true nature of Kant’s critical philosophy, are among the distinguishing features 
of Heideggerian interpretations of Kant. 
According to Heidegger, the addition of the question “What is man?” to the questions 
“What can I know?” “What should I do?” “What may I hope for?” proves that Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy is, first and foremost, a philosophical anthropology.20 This is 
demonstrated by the fact that Kant says the other three questions “relate to [beziehen auf]” the 
fourth question about man.21 For Heidegger, this means that all of Kant’s theoretical and practical 
philosophy is grounded in, and reducible to, a theory of the subjectivity of the subject. Ultimately, 
this means that Kant’s three critiques are nothing more than elaborations of different aspects of 
human subjectivity. 
Throughout Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger distinguishes Kant’s 
philosophical anthropology—which attempts to found metaphysics on “the subjectivity of the 
subject”—from the empirical science of man—which is concerned with the biological, 
psychological, and social characteristics of human beings. Yet he also suggests that Kant’s failure 
                                                 
18 The shortcomings of Kant’s Logic (1800)—which was published by Benjamin Jäsche, a former student and 
colleague of Kant—have been well documented by Kant scholars; see, for example, Terry Boswell, “On the 
Textual Authenticity of Kant’s Logic,” History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 9 (1988), 193-203. 
19 Although it is common for continental philosophers to regard Kant’s critical philosophy as a philosophy of the 
subject, this approach has never been favored by Kantian scholars. That is probably sufficient to explain the 
indifference with which most Kant scholars regard the “What is man?” question. Yet recent studies of Kant’s 
Anthropology have only made Kant scholars more suspicious of the sweeping conclusions that are often drawn 
from this question, because they show how much more complicated the relationship between the transcendental 
unity of apperception, moral personhood, and humanity is in Kant than was previously realized. See, for 
example Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert B. Louden, 
Kant’s Human Being: Essays on his Theory of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Patrick 
Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
and Patrick Frierson, What is the Human Being? (London: Routledge, 2013). 
20 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997 [5th edition]), 144 (§36). 
21 Ibid., 144-146 (§36). When interpreting this passage, it should be noted that Kant’s account of the relation 
between the anthropological question and the other three questions does not appear in any text written by Kant 
himself. One set of student transcripts, the Metaphysik Pölitz, possibly dating from 1790-1791, does mention the 
“relation [Beziehung]” between the anthropological question and the other three questions, but Kant does not 
mention any such relation between the anthropological question and the other three questions in a letter to Carl 
Friedrich Stäudlin from 1793; see Immanuel Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by Royal Prussian and later 
German, then Berlin-Brandenburg (Academy of the Sciences, Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter, 
1900), XXVIII.2.1, 533-534; see also Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 458; Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, (XI), 429.  
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to identify the “common root” of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding in the 
imagination led him to fall back on an empirical conception of man for his account of the 
“subjectivity of the subject.”22 In effect, Heidegger charges Kant with grounding his account of 
transcendental subjectivity on the empirical conception of man that is found in Kant’s 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.  
The fact that Foucault asks, in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, whether there might 
be “a certain concrete image of man” at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason, whose origins can 
be found in Kant’s Anthropology, suggests that he was, at the very least, concerned with the same 
problem as Heidegger.23 The relationship between the conception of “man” as transcendental 
subject and the understanding of “man” that emerges in empirical science in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries is just as central to Foucault’s Introduction as it is for Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics. In fact, given the context in which he was reading Kant and writing his Introduction, 
it is likely that the account of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental that 
Foucault develops in his study of Kant’s Anthropology is based on Heidegger’s Kantbuch. Yet it 
would be a mistake to assume that Foucault simply adopts Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant 
uncritically. Instead, he appropriates Heidegger’s understanding of Kant for his own purposes 
and, in the process, challenges the account of the relationship between man as a transcendental 
subject and man as the object of an empirical science that Heidegger proposed.  
 It becomes clear that Foucault does not follow Heidegger uncritically only a few sentences 
after he asks whether Kant’s Critique might be based on “a certain concrete image of man” found 
in Kant’s Anthropology. Instead of pursuing this question and trying to reduce Kant’s account of 
transcendental subjectivity to empirical anthropology—as Heidegger had done at the end of his 
Kantbuch—Foucault asks whether it might be possible that man, as described in Kant’s 
Anthropology, is really just an expression of the homo criticus that was first conceived in the Critique 
of Pure Reason.24 The conjunction of these two different ways of thinking about man in Foucault’s 
Introduction is significant, because it shows that Foucault does not simply accept Heidegger’s 
account of the origins of Kant’s philosophical anthropology. Foucault seriously considers 
Heidegger’s account, but he is just as willing to consider an alternative possibility—the possibility 
that Kant’s anthropology derives its conception of man from transcendental philosophy. 
Later in the Introduction, when he returns to the “What is man?” question from Kant’s 
Logic, Foucault seems to privilege the view that the conception of man in Kant’s Anthropology 
derives from transcendental philosophy. At the beginning of this section, I called the “What is 
man?” question a Heideggerian shibboleth, because readers of Kant who are influenced by 
                                                 
22 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 146-153 (§37-§38). Heidegger’s claim that the imagination is the 
common root of the faculties of sensibility and the understanding was refuted by Dieter Henrich in “On the 
Unity of Subjectivity” (1955); see Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, edited by 
Richard Velkley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 17-54. 
23 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 19. 
24 Ibid., 19-20. 
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Heidegger often regard it as the key to Kant’s account of the “subjectivity of the subject.” 
Foucault may be counted among those readers, because he agrees that the question concerning 
man “shows itself to be the fundamental question of philosophical reflection.”25 Like Heidegger, 
Foucault tries to explain how the question concerning man “relates to” the questions “What can I 
know?” “What ought I to do?” and “What may I hope for?”26 Unlike Heidegger, however, 
Foucault argues that the answers to these questions are not founded upon, or reducible to, the 
question concerning man. They relate to that question in a number of different ways, 
corresponding to the different senses in which Kant understands man in the different parts of the 
critical philosophy. First, there is the conception of man as transcendental subject in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, which relates to the question “what can I know?” There is also the conception of man 
as “person” in Kant’s moral philosophy, which relates to the question “what ought I to do?” 
Finally, there is the conception of man that relates to the philosophy of religion and the question 
“what may I hope for?” According to Heidegger, the conception of man that is to be found in 
Kant’s anthropology explains all of these different senses, because Kant (allegedly) says we could 
“reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one.”27 
Foucault denies this claim, insisting that the question concerning man “has no independent 
content.”28 It merely repeats the divisions of the faculties and the different parts of Kant’s critical 
philosophy. 
Foucault’s account of the “What is man?” question is, I think, clearly a step beyond 
Heidegger, because it provides a more sophisticated account of what it means for the 
anthropological question to “relate to” the other questions with which Kant was concerned. Yet it 
poses a similar problem: Foucault’s account of the relation between the anthropological question 
and the other questions seems to subordinate the empirical conception of man to transcendental 
philosophy. Foucault seems to confirm this suspicion when he says the “structure and function” 
of the “empiricity” at stake in Kant’s Anthropology is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason.29 
Ultimately, Foucault argues, the “empiricity” of the Anthropology is nothing more than the 
repetition, in time, of the a priori of the first Critique.30  
While Heidegger’s account of the collapse of Kant’s philosophical anthropology at least 
provided a ready account of Kant’s shortcomings and the need for a more radical foundation, 
nothing is simplified by Foucault’s account. Indeed, Foucault argues, founding the empiricity of 
anthropology on the repetition of transcendental philosophy produces a great deal of confusion. 
When we try to understand the relation between the empirical repetition of transcendental 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 76. 
26 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 146 (§36); Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 75-76. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, edited and translated by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 538; Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, (IX), 25; Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, 146 (§36). 
28 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 86. 
29 Ibid., 88. 
30 Ibid., 93. 
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philosophy and transcendental philosophy itself, Foucault thinks we will inevitably encounter the 
question of limits and the problem of finitude.31 The problem of finitude is a problem that arises 
because the relationship between the anthropological question and the other three questions is 
not clearly defined. We understand that the answer to the question “What is man?” is related to 
the answer to the questions “What can I know?” “What ought I to do?” and “What may I hope 
for?” but we do not know exactly how. We know only that man is related to transcendental 
subjectivity, moral personhood, and the revolution in human nature that is the ultimate object of 
religion; yet he is reducible to none of them, because they all transcend him.32 Nor does man have 
any content or meaning of his own. Understanding the limit this imposes on anthropological 
reflection positively and empirically is the task of the analytic of finitude that emerges from 
Kant’s anthropological-critical repetition. 
 
Kant and Heidegger in The Order of Things 
The problem of finitude may be the overriding concern in the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 
but Foucault refuses to make that problem an essential problem of thought or existence. He does 
not elevate the problem of finitude to the level of fundamental ontology as Heidegger does in 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.33 Instead, Foucault historicizes the relation between the 
empirical and the transcendental that leads to the problem of finitude, in order to make way for a 
different way of thinking. 
Foucault’s historical approach to the problem of finitude is already apparent at the end of 
the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, where he suggests that “one day, the whole history of post-
Kantian and contemporary philosophy will have to be envisaged from the point of view of the 
perpetuation of this confusion—a revised history which would start out by denouncing it.”34 The 
confusion to be denounced is, of course, the ambiguous relationship between the empirical and 
transcendental senses of man that leads to the problem of finitude. This confusion is to be 
denounced, because it allows man to function “as an impure and unthought hybrid within the 
internal economy of philosophy.”35 Foucault thinks this is particularly apparent in Husserlian 
phenomenology and Heidegger’s analysis of Being-in-the-world, which Foucault describes as the 
“empirical mortgage” (l’hypothèque de l’empiricité) of Husserl’s failure to overcome the limits Kant 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 106. 
32 Foucault acknowledges that Kant’s question “What may I hope for?” pertains to religion, as Kant specifies in 
several different places. However, in his account of this question, Foucault relates it to a passage in the Opus 
Postumum and makes it a question about the limits of reason (see Ibid., 82); see also Kant, Lectures on Logic, 458; 
Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, (IX), 25. In this sentence, I have corrected Foucault’s reference and excluded the 
extraneous discussion of the limits of reason. However, I wish to acknowledge that this separates my analysis 
from Foucault’s account to some extent. 
33 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1-2. 
34 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 107. 
35 Ibid., 106. 
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imposed on transcendental reflection. By “destructuring” the Kantian legacy in phenomenology, 
Foucault hopes to bring to an end “the proliferation of questions about man.”36  
The Order of Things develops this approach further and more systematically. In the second 
part of the book, Foucault situates the analytic of finitude within the modern episteme. By 
contrasting the order of knowledge in modernity with the order of knowledge in the classical age, 
Foucault demonstrates that the problem of finitude is not an essential or necessary problem. It is, 
on the contrary, a problem that emerges within a particular order of knowledge. The order makes 
the problem possible and the problem disappears when the order dissolves. When, at the end of 
The Order of Things, Foucault says man is “an invention of a recent date” and “the effect of a 
change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge,” he is suggesting that this arrangement 
can disappear, just as the order that defined the classical age disappeared at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The image of man being erased “like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the 
sea” is a reminder that the problem of finitude, as it arises from the modern episteme, is contingent 
and unnecessary.37 Foucault’s archaeology explains the structure, function, and experience of that 
contingency.38 
In addition to the general, archaeological framework in which Foucault treats the problem 
of finitude, there is also a more specific account of the problem in the second part of The Order of 
Things. Given the emphasis he placed on the relationship between the empirical and 
transcendental in Kant and its relation to the problem of finitude in the Introduction, it is hardly 
surprising that Foucault identifies “the Kantian critique” as “the threshold of our modernity.”39 
According to Foucault, Kant’s critical philosophy “questions representation, not in accordance 
with the endless movement that proceeds from the simple element to all its possible 
combinations, but on the basis of its rightful limits.”40 As such, critical philosophy distinguishes 
itself from the philosophies that preceded it—both rationalist and empiricist—by founding 
knowledge in a transcendental condition that precedes experience. This condition may be grasped 
in transcendental reflection—as the a priori—but only to the extent that this is possible for a 
transcendental subject. Because this subject lacks a power of intellectual intuition, the problem of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 124. 
37 Foucault, The Order of Things, 387. 
38 It could be argued that Foucault’s account of the contingency of epistemes results in a certain conception of 
finitude, insofar as the order of each episteme is limited to a particular historical period and bounded by other 
epistemes. However, this conception of finitude differs considerably from the problem of finitude that Foucault 
describes in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, which follows from the confused relation between the 
empirical and the transcendental. It also differs considerably from the analytic of finitude Foucault describes in 
The Order of Things, where the problem of the relation between the empirical and the transcendental devolves 
into “anthropologism.”  
39 Foucault, The Order of Things, 242. 
40 Ibid. 
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finitude emerges in philosophy, so that “knowledge can no longer be deployed against the 
background of a unified and unifying mathesis.”41  
Foucault describes how a similar approach emerges in empirical sciences, where labor, life, 
and language appear as “so many transcendentals” at the end of the eighteenth century.42 Labor, 
life, and language function as transcendentals, because they “make possible the objective 
knowledge of living beings, the laws of production, and the forms of language,” but remain 
“outside of knowledge.”43 They refer, instead, to the “force” of labor, the “energy” of life, and the 
“power” of speech, none of which can be observed or measured in themselves.44 Nevertheless, 
these “new empiricities” differ from transcendental philosophy in two crucial respects. First, the 
condition of empirical knowledge is located in an object and not in the transcendental subject.45 
Second, they are concerned with the “positivity” of what appears, rather than the “negativity” of 
its conditions.46 This creates a conflict between transcendental philosophy and empirical science 
that was, according to Foucault, constitutive of European thought during the nineteenth 
century.47 
The conflict between transcendental philosophy and empirical science is resolved when 
man assumes “the place of the king.”48 Transcendental philosophy, empirical objectivity, and 
appearance are all related to man, but this leads to even greater problems. Modern economics, 
biology, and philology explain the “concrete existence” of man—his labor, life, and language—
but they do so in a way that makes him appear “exterior to himself,” as an object rather than 
subject.49 Transcendental philosophy allows man to reflect on himself as the condition of all his 
knowledge, but this does not overcome the difference between man as object of the empirical 
sciences and man as the subject of transcendental reflection. Man becomes an “empirical-
transcendental doublet” whose finitude is evident in his inability to resolve the two sides of his 
existence. Philosophy and science then become an “analytic of finitude,” insofar as they alternate 
between one side of the doublet and the other, endlessly repeating the dialectic of identity and 
difference that doubles and redoubles the relation between the empirical and the transcendental 
and their limits. However, in doing so, they fall prey to the prejudice of “anthropologism,” which 
Foucault calls “the great internal threat to knowledge in our day.”50  
It might seem that we have strayed very far from Heidegger at this point. However, the 
same Heideggerian themes that appear in Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology also 
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appear in his account of the analytic of finitude in The Order of Things. Again, the major issue is 
finitude, which is a problem for empirical science and transcendental philosophy. The 
understanding of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental is similarly 
understood through the question “What is man?” and the way it relates to the possibility of 
knowledge. Foucault also quotes the passage in which this question appears from Kant’s Logic. 
And, even more than in the Introduction, Foucault presents an account of the relation between 
Kant’s four questions that shows transcendental philosophy, from Kant to Husserl, collapsing 
into anthropology. This, I think, testifies to the continuing influence of Heidegger’s reading of 
Kant on Foucault. There is nevertheless a serious challenge to this reading that emerges from 
Foucault’s archaeology. Instead of leading on to fundamental ontology, as Heidegger would have 
it, the analytic of finitude that arises from the anthropologism of the modern age is, for Foucault, 
a historical configuration of knowledge that is to be overcome.  
 
Overcoming Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant 
Although Kant and Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant were central themes of his major works 
from the early and mid-1960s, Foucault rarely mentions them in works from the late 1960s to the 
mid-1970s. Kant’s name is almost entirely absent from The Archaeology of Knowledge, Discipline and 
Punish, and The History of Sexuality; yet that does not mean Foucault had abandoned the problems 
that were so central to his earlier works. Indeed, Foucault continued to struggle with the 
relationship between the empirical and the transcendental in Kant as well as the influence of 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant until the very end of his career.  
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Foucault developed a very different way of reading 
Kant than the one he found in Heidegger in the 1950’s. In a number of texts from the late 70’s and 
80’s, Foucault opposes a conception of critique defined by the Critique of Pure Reason as “the 
analysis and reflection upon limits” to a “critical attitude” that transgresses the limits Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy imposes upon thought and the constraints that discipline imposes 
upon subjects.51 Foucault finds an example of this attitude—an example he admires and to which 
he repeatedly returns—in Kant’s essay An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Unlike 
the Critique of Pure Reason or Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant’s enlightenment 
essay is an intervention in a contemporary debate about the time in which Kant lived and the way 
that period ought to be characterized. Foucault places a great deal of emphasis on this aspect of 
Kant’s essay in the opening session of his lectures at the Collège de France in 1982-1983, 
commenting the journal in which Kant’s essay was published, its contribution to the German 
enlightenment, and the importance of the Christian Aufklärung and the Jewish Haskala in that 
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particular context.52 It is the situatedness of Kant’s essay, its relation to its time and place, that 
distinguishes it from his critical philosophy and his anthropology for Foucault. 
Because Kant takes the historical and political situation of the enlightenment seriously, 
Foucault thinks “a new type of question appears in the field of philosophical reflection” in Kant’s 
essay.53 A few pages later, Foucault identifies this question as the question of modernity, which 
emerges from the enlightenment as “an undoubtedly very singular cultural process which very 
quickly became aware of itself in a certain fashion, by naming itself and situating itself in relation 
to its past, future and present, by giving the name Aufklärung to the process, rather to the 
operations that this movement must effectuate within its own present.”54 The question of 
modernity interests Foucault, not only because it emerges within the context of the enlightenment 
and problematizes that context, but also because it “did not remain localized within the 
eighteenth century or even the process of Aufklärung.”55 Instead, the question of modernity gave 
rise to “a certain way of philosophizing,” which Foucault calls “modern” philosophy, whose 
essential function is “questioning itself about its own present reality.”56 
Foucault’s essay “What is Enlightenment,” which he prepared for a seminar he was to 
attend at Boston College with Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Charles Taylor in 1984, was 
probably composed at about the same time as the 1982-1983 lectures.57 Foucault’s essay takes up 
the question of modernity that Kant introduced in his enlightenment essay, but it also goes 
beyond commentary to describe the kind of philosophical reflection that Foucault considers both 
modern and necessary. After reviewing the context and contents of Kant’s essay, and digressing 
about Baudelaire and the modern attitude, Foucault says he has “been seeking to stress that the 
thread which may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, 
but, rather, the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could 
be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”58 The “permanent critique of our 
historical era” that Foucault associates with the “philosophical ethos” of the enlightenment is 
nothing other than the “modern” philosophy that Foucault identifies in his 1982-1983 lectures. 
His attempt to reactivate that enlightenment “critique” and that “modern” philosophy leads him 
to sketch its contours at the end of his essay. 
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Negatively, Foucault says, the reactivation of the philosophical ethos of the enlightenment 
must resist what he calls “the blackmail of the enlightenment”—the insistence that enlightenment 
is something one must be “for” or “against.”59 If one is to adopt a critical attitude, one must 
“refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian 
alternative” and engage in a series of historical analyses that are “as precise as possible,” so as to 
determine “what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as 
autonomous subjects.”60 One must also remember that the conditions of our autonomous self-
constitution are particular—they are not necessary or sufficient conditions for human self-
actualization. Humanism may have been as important for enlightenment thought as it was for 
classical philosophy, Christian theology, Marxism, and existentialism; yet Foucault warns against 
the confusion that results from identifying humanism and the enlightenment. While humanism 
“has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science, 
or politics,” the critical attitude of the enlightenment problematizes these concepts and questions 
their significance for the present.61 By avoiding the blackmail of the enlightenment and the 
identification of humanism and the enlightenment, Foucault thinks we will be better able to 
understand the present, and to reflect on it critically and philosophically.  
Positively, Foucault calls the critical attitude of the enlightenment a “limit-attitude.”62 
However, the attitude one adopts towards limits involved in this kind of philosophy is different 
from the “analysis and reflection upon limits” found in Kant’s critical philosophy.63 While 
Kantian critique attempts to determine “what limits knowledge must renounce exceeding,” 
Foucault says the critical attitude of the enlightenment must be “a critique of what we are saying 
thinking, and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves.”64 This critique leads us to 
question whether the limits imposed upon us are really “universal, necessary, obligatory” and 
what place is occupied by “whatever is singular, contingent, and the produce of arbitrary 
constraints.”65 As a result of this questioning, Foucault says, critique must abandon “the search 
for formal structures with universal value” and transform itself into “a historical investigation 
into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of 
what we are doing, thinking, saying.”66 “In that sense,” he continues, “this criticism is not 
transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible; it is genealogical in its 
design and archaeological in its method.”67 Foucault goes on to specify that this critique will be 
“archaeological—and not transcendental—in the sense that it will seek to identify the universal 
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structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of 
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events.”68 And he 
explains that  
 
this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we 
are what it is possible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we 
are, do, or think.69  
 
These claims are important, because, in the space of a few sentences, Foucault effectively 
identifies his own work with the philosophical ethos of the enlightenment. Not only does he 
endorse the “limit-attitude” the enlightenment adopts with respect to the present, but he even 
suggests the method through which enlightenment “critique” proceeds is essentially the same as 
his own archaeological-genealogical investigations. Finally, before he moves on to a new 
discussion, he also seems to endorse the aims of enlightenment critique—“to give new impetus, 
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”70 
At this point, it might be necessary to remind ourselves that Foucault’s account of the 
critical attitude of the enlightenment, an attitude with which he associates his own work, is 
derived from his reflection on Kant’s enlightenment essay. The difference between the Kant that 
Foucault finds in his studies of “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” and the 
Kant that he calls “the threshold of our modernity” in The Order of Things is both radical and 
tremendously significant. The fact that Foucault finds in Kant’s enlightenment essay a different 
kind of critique, one that leads beyond the anthropologism of the analytic of finitude is evidence 
that Foucault was pushing beyond Heideggerean interpretation he adopted in the 1950s, toward a 
new reading of Kant that would help him overcome the conception of man as an empirical-
transcendental double that had come to dominate the human sciences. That he continues to 
oppose the critical attitude that he finds in Kant’s enlightenment essay to the “analysis and 
reflection upon limits,” however, suggests that Heidegger’s reading of Kant remained an obstacle 
that he would have to overcome.71 
 
Conclusions 
I have argued that the editors of the French edition of Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology are likely correct when they say that Foucault began reading Kant through 
Heidegger in the early 1950’s. While there is no definitive evidence proving the truth of this claim, 
there is a great deal of evidence supporting its probability. Moreover, there is considerable 
evidence that Foucault’s understanding of Kant was shaped by Heidegger in his Introduction and 
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The Order of Things. Foucault’s preoccupation with the question “What is man?” from Kant’s Logic 
and the way it “relates to” the questions “What can I know?” “What ought I to do?” and “What 
may I hope for?” suggests that Foucault’s interest in the relationship between transcendental 
philosophy and anthropology is derived from Heidegger’s Kantbuch. Similarly, his account of the 
confusion that emerges from the anthropological-critical repetition and the anthropologism 
associated with the analytic of finitude suggest that Foucault’s objections to Kant are closely 
related to Heidegger’s criticism of Kant.  
Nevertheless, there is in Foucault a series of criticisms of Heidegger’s understanding of 
Kant that complicates any account of Heidegger’s influence. First, in the Introduction, Foucault 
rejects Heidegger’s account of the relation between the question concerning man and the other 
three questions. Foucault complicates the relation between these questions and, instead of 
arguing that Kant’s transcendental philosophy collapses back into empirical anthropology, 
suggests that Kant’s anthropology is merely a confused repetition of the conceptions of man that 
emerged in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Although he agrees with Heidegger that the 
central problem that arises from Kant is the problem of finitude, Foucault denies that there is 
anything essential or fundamental about this problem. The problem of finitude is not a problem 
of fundamental ontology, but the effect of a certain order of knowledge. Instead of meditating on 
the profundity of the analytic of finitude, or making oracular pronouncements calling it 
“originary” and “essential,” Foucault calls for its overcoming. 
Foucault’s meditations on Kant’s essay “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?” suggest that one way to overcome the analytic of finitude is to adopt a critical 
attitude like the one that emerged during the enlightenment and use it to develop new “modern” 
forms of philosophical reflection. In “What is Enlightenment,” Foucault recommends this attitude 
and these forms of reflection as ways of transgressing the limits that have been imposed upon 
what we think, say, do, and are. By transgressing these limits, we promote what Foucault calls 
“the undefined work of freedom,” claiming for ourselves the autonomy to constitute ourselves as 
subjects.72 It is significant that Foucault’s account of this attitude and these forms of reflection 
derive from his studies of Kant’s enlightenment essay, because it represents a very different way 
of reading Kant than the one Foucault adopted from Heidegger in the 1950s, which played a 
decisive role in his archaeology of the human sciences in the 1960s. That Foucault discovered a 
different way to read Kant during the late 1970s and early 1980s suggests that he was making 
progress in his attempt to overcome the analytic of finitude. Yet the fact that he still sees Kant’s 
critical philosophy as the obstacle to be overcome by a new critical attitude and new forms of 
philosophical reflection suggests that he was still struggling with the Heideggerean interpretation 
of Kant that he encountered in the 1950s. 
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